Methodological Naturalism
by Sara B.
December, 2005
In coming to understand the world which surrounds and encompasses us as human beings, we have been able to test certain occurrences within the physical universe and come to understand them in their predictability and testability. In its original denotations this study is known as “science” and consists of testing hypotheses and organizing the data's results to understand regularities and laws within the physical universe. Science, in it's connotation however, has come to contain a wide range of meanings and substructures, including those things which cannot be empirically verified. Of these include studies such as theology and philosophy. Scientist claim that such studies are outside the range of empirically verifiable evidence and therefore should not be considered “science”. However many philosophers, and more prominently theologians, have tackled this argument and asserted that their worldviews are compatible with science studies and should be allowed within the frameworks of science. They reject the notion of methodological naturalism (MN) and the limitations they feel it holds.
MN's basic tenets assume that the methodology of natural science can only be based on evidence to which is empirically verifiable. The goal of science is to explain “the contingent natural phenomena strictly in forms of other contingent natural phenomena” (Moreland, Reynolds “On Creation and Evolution” 19). The scientific item in question must be empirically qualified or falsified by reference to natural law and employ measurable factors by which predictions prove to be repeatable and fruitful in guiding future research. This is not to say that one must be atheistic to do science, but rather that they cannot infer into their hypotheses an element of supernatural force. This method of conducting science must not be confused with metaphysical naturalism, which states that natural forces are all that exist. The theist then may conduct science within the methods ascribed by MN as long as he or she realizes this tool provides only partial truths (Haarsma, 78). They believe that all authentic science corresponds to God's activity in the world without embracing metaphysical naturalism. One can take scientific methodology without its naturalistic philosophies and call it “MN”. Michael Ruses' definition of MN states: “The methodological naturalist is the person who assumes that the world runs according to unbroken law; that humans can understand the world in terms of this law; and that science involves just such understanding without any reference to extra or supernatural forces like God. Whether there are such forces or beings is another matter and entirely and simply not addressed by methodological naturalism”(Ruse, 364.)
MN is not able to explain (yet) all physical events in the world and this is where theists believe this method of conducting science falls short. Because there are such phenomena (such as origins of the universe) which may never be explained by science theists believe it is scientifically okay to assume God's miraculous activity. Paul Nelson and J.M Reynolds state that “to the practicing Christian scientist the limitation of scientific descriptively to natural categories is not at all the necessary result of an atheistic worldview by simply a choice to make it possible for science to be a well-defied and reliable albeit limited activity” (Nelson, Reynolds, 262).
Opponents to MN must plead their case and supply support in order to gain credibility within the scientific world. Alvin Plantinga, possibly Americas most prominent philosopher of religion, in comparing creationism with evolution suggests that if theists adapt an attitude such that an acceptable hypothesis consists only of the laws of science, than by far the most probable of the scientific hypotheses for the make up of the universe is evolution (Plantinga, 137). The theists' use of MN leads to this conclusions for two basic reasons: 1) we don't know how it all happened and 2) it involves confusions between claim that all this “scientific acceptable hypotheses leave common ancestry as the most probable explanation” (Plantinga 138). Although it would be best if a proposition in question proves to be empirically verifiable, we cannot limit ourselves to it simply because some developed standpoint of naturalism assumes it so. Theists must choose the hypothesis which is best overall. Plantinga continues his argument in asserting that the Christian theist is not limited to that which has some scientific evidence, unlike the naturalist. We know the creation is from the Lord, and we aren't held down to a priori dogmas as to how the Lord did it (Plantinga, 138-139). Accordingly, Plantinga suggests scientists and other academics need to utilize both cultural criticism and Christian science (Plantinga, 141). Further, Plantinga even seems to question of whether natural laws even exists. Consider the following statement: “There are regularities, of course, but a regularity is not yet a law; a law is what is supposed to explain and ground a regularity. Furthermore, a law is supposed to hold with some kinds of necessity typically thought to be less stringent than broadly logical necessity, but necessity nonetheless.” (Plantinga, 146). Whether conventional science is satisfactory or not, the study should be open to something broader. Something which allows for the intervention of God, as we might call “miraculous”. To limit theistic science to theories of MN makes the theist seem as if he is moving in a path of desperation. He does, however, criticize the use of the God-of-the-Gaps theory, since he believes God is consistently involved in creation and in complete governance of it. God does not need to intervene now and then, but rather has a constant presence within it. Therefore, “...the right way for the Christian community to attain scientific understanding” includes that which we know by way of faith (Plantinga, 341).
Michael Ruse is one of Plantinga's main opposer's. His article in I.D. Creationist and it's Critics entitled “Methodological Naturalism under Attack”is a rebuttal to many of the criticisms of Plantinga. For starters, Ruse provides the following definitions to science: “...what we mean by the word 'science' in general usage is something that does not make reference to God and so forth, but which is marked by methodological naturalism. To associate evolution, for example, to an atheistic philosophy is a mistake of many theistic scientists. He believes in order for something to be truly scientific it must follow these guidelines (Ruse, 296-301 {1996}):
Scientific explanation “relies exclusively on blind, undirected natural laws and naturalistic process.”
“A scientific explanation may try to explain how one phenomenon follows in a right and definite way, as a result of the working of natural law.”
Conclusions of science must be testable
Conclusions of science must be tentative.
Ruse does not propose the there isn't presuppositions within the realms of scientific study, he does hold firm to the belief that we should do our best to work outside of our presuppositions, whether they be atheistic or theistically grounded. He states “...the scientist may or may not have very strong theological views, which one may or may not share. But inasmuch as one is going to the scientist for science, theology can and must be ruled out as irrelevant (Ruse, 366 {2001}). Plantinga does make reference to the what he believes are inadequacies of the evolutionary theory. But he obviously, as Ruse believes, has made up his mind of the issue prior to starting the investigation. Plantinga might use arguments against the atheistic scientist claiming they begin with a presupposition which effects the outcome, however he himself is guilty of the same accusation. Ruse claims that Plantinga uses a similar type of attack to MN in areas of study such as paleontology, systematics, animal instinct, and embryology. However, his argumentation against the scientific outcomes of such things are very similar to his own.
Some may claim, as does Plantinga, that not all science appears to be “repeatable” and therefore cannot be considered a “law” or “regularity”. Therefore, MN should be abandoned as an adequate form of testing hypotheses. However, in using the example of the extinction of dinosaurs, Ruse admits that it may not be a repeatable phenomena, but the various components involved in the extinction may be brought beneath regularity. Things such as the death of plants (Ruse, 368, {2001}).
In conclusion of Ruse's claims and propositions of MN we must note that he does admit that “methodological naturalism does not succeed in doing everything that it sets out to do. It may be that it never will. But to assume that there are going to be 'science stoppers', and that this should lead one to pull back from a commitment of methodological naturalism is to reveal that one has another agenda” (Ruse, 381 {2001}). Plantinga is committed to a tight and extreme literal interpretation of the Bible, and refuses to allow scientific evidences to challenge his interpretations of such things. It is made obvious that Plantinga's agenda is that of Christianity, and unfortunately this may have caused him to be ignorant to current works of science . Although proved right by empirically scientific theories Plantinga does not give these scientists and their conclusions the credit they deserve (Ruse, 382 {2001}).
Loren Haarsma in his article “Does Science Exclude God?” states that although God can and does intervene in nature, it usually works in consistent ways. However, since the factors which brought on the scientific revolution are still debated “neither atheists nor Christians should claim to 'own' the scientific method” (Haarsma, 80). People of various faiths may disagree in regards to philosophical beliefs about God and nature however by working side-by-side they can reach some consensus on scientific questions.
Haarsma, again referring to the usual consistency within nature, asks how then should the Christian conduct science outside the boundaries of MN? In regards to an unusual event, science cannot seem to either prove nor disprove the superseding of the law effected (Haarsma, 84). Science, although not able to scientifically explain a cause for some events, puts the situation into one of two categories: “unexplained” or “partially explained”. Yet, events which fall into these categories are able to change as new empirical methods are developed. However, there are some events which are known to have happened and have no scientific explanation. The Christian theist then can reasonably assume that God is able to supersede natural laws, and does in fact do so, which results in a certain event to be “unexplained” within the framework of scientific empiricalism. However, Haarsma does not believe a lack of evidence necessarily means the Christian should embrace it as a potential cause for a miracle but opens the possibility of it being so. Scientific proofs can be just as glorifying as, and more helpful theologically, as assuming God's supernatural intervention (Haarsma, 94).
In Science Held Hostage Howard Van Till, Young, and Menninga provide two main questions lying outside the realm of MN. First, although science can account for the various structures of the physical world it is not able to deal with the question of origins (Van Till “Science Held Hostage” 20). We are able to deal with events which occur within time, but natural science is unable to account for those things which concern the very existence of time. Those who adapt MN are left with no choice but to remain silent on the issue. Secondly, although natural science can investigate the behavior of physical things, it cannot answer the question concerning its governance. “The question of governance cannot be answered by describing patterns of behavior” (Van Till, “Science Held Hostage” 23). Following a MN approach to science would inhibit the naturalist from making a distinction between an autonomous or a theonomous perspective on the governance of physical behavior. Therefore the authors suggest that MN is intelligible with resident inside of the physical universe but unintelligible to describe the relationship between the physical universe and the transcendent realm (Van Till “Science Held Hostage” 25). Van Till attempts to make an appropriate balance between Christian faithfulness and intellectual integrity. He states that “neither natural science nor Christian theology can claim to deal comprehensively with all aspects of reality, and neither can claim that their theories capture the fullness of the reality they seek to represent.” (Van Till, 173 {1999}). He admits that theology is concerned with God and His relation to creation, contemporary natural science focuses on the natural world and how its developed properties and capabilities behave over time. Likewise, to force science to explain questions about divine action is exaggerating the competence of natural science. He feels, like Ruse, that for theology to assume its competence to speak on different properties and systems within formational history is an inaccuracy (Van Till, 174 {1999}). To summarize his views on MN, Van Till suggests that the theist should ask questions about the natural sciences and slowly move into questions which force a person to look outside of science for the answer. Therefore, science is not forced to assume any sort of presuppositions, neither is theology impeding on scientific facts nor pressing on the walls of it's structure.
J.P Moreland also acts as a strong critic against MN and the claims that it is necessary for a study of natural science (NS). Some claim that NS limits science to physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy and related fields. Theistic science is than considered faulty and seen as an unfruitful research program. Moreland believes that any view of science which is limited in this way should be abandoned. He seeks to undercut the advocates of this “hands-off” view of science which is proposed be individuals, such as Van Till, and wishes attack their arguments (Moreland, 42 {1994}). He believes that such claims to “science reduce physical object statements about actual or possible sense data which turn out to be private metal entities” (Moreland, 50 {1994}). If this is true, the study of the existence of matter is not a necessity for the study of natural science. Likewise, Moreland attests that NS has a number of goals for scientific theory formulation: simplicity of theories, empirical accuracy, predictive successfulness, clarity and consistency, fruitfulness in future research and avoidance of certain explanatory devices. It is not limited to one goal which insists on MN. A realist and anti-realist may have different interpretations of these goals. The realists sees these epistemic virtues as true, whereas the anti-realist believes these virtues merely show the rationality and preservation of the phenomena. If the goal of NS is stated in realist terms then anti-realist statements of science become impossible. He believes that anti realist treatments of the goals are philosophies of science (Moreland, 49 {1994}).
Moreland concludes that trying to discredit theistic science based on the demarcation of criteria is not successful. Although these claims are not primarily scientific, they act as a philosophical left-hand giving input into science of which the scientist is not qualified (Moreland, 43 {1994}). Moreland agrees that the physical universe is an important study, but admits that not all of its aspects or qualities are within the realm of scientific inquiry. Questions regarding transcendent issues (such as origins) are outside the domain of MN and NS. For thinkers such as Van Till than to abandon this fact is to deny the history of science.
What, than, does Moreland believe theology provides for the study of natural science? He believes it sheds light on scientific conclusions for the following four reasons:
by providing rationally justified background beliefs against which rational assessment of a specific scientific theory can be made,
yielding positive and negative result that can be tested,
by recommending certain methodological rules over others, and
by providing extrinsic goals of science and helping to justify intrinsic goals for science (Moreland, 56 {1994}).
In an assessment of these views proposed by creditable scholars, philosophers and scientists we can safely conclude that there consists an extreme plurality of thought about the proper methodologies as to which science must be subject to. Some believe, as we have seen that the limitations that science conducted strictly within MN. They hold that the natural scientists' assumption that theist science is fundamentally misguided is an improper attitude towards the integration of science and theology (Moreland, 42). An appropriate conclusions to their thoughts are provided in the words of John Stek:
Theology must take account of all that humanity comes to know about the world, and science must equally take account of all that we come to know about God. In fact, we cannot, without denying our being and vocation as stewards, pursue theology without brining to study all that we know about the world, nor can we, without denying our being and vocation as stewards, pursue science without brining to that study all that we know about God (Stek, 260-1).
On the other side of the spectrum are the theistic adherers to MN, namely that of Michael Ruse. His views, and those theistic scientists who follow MN as well, may be summarized in this following statement:
“...I am not prepared to accept that methodological naturalism is a philosophy opposed to theism. I see no reason at all to den the Christian access to methodological naturalism, saying that it is untenable for the Christian to insist that in our understanding of the natural world one employ only the methodologically naturalistic approach (Ruse, 383 {2001}).
The theistic scientists must decide where he or she stands on such issues, and be prepared to offer rebuttals to the opposing arguments. Ultimately, we should seek to find a balance between the two, without forsaking the goals of the other. Maybe Van Tills suggestions to science and theology contributing to the other is a proper goal to attempt to achieve. In any case, we should realize that the debate between the two will not cease until either science or God proves to be unmistakingly ungrounded and falls into utter ruin. We must wait to see which falls first.
Works Cited
Haarsma, Loren. “Does Science Exclude God? Natural Law, Chance, Miracles, and
Scientific Practice.” Perspectives on an Evolving Creation. Ed. Keith B Miller.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2003.
Moreland, J.P. “Theistic Science and Methodological Naturalism.” The Creation Hypothesis. Ed. J.P Moreland. Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994.
Moreland, J.P, John Mark Reynolds. Introduction. Three Views On Creation and Evolution. Ed. J.P Moreland, John Mark Reynolds. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999.
Nelson, Paul, John Mark Reynolds. “Young Earth Creationism.” Three Views on Creation and Evolution. Ed. J.P Moreland and John Mark Reynolds. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999.
Plantinga, Alvin. “When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible.” I.D Creationism and It's Critics. Ed. Robert T. Pennock. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Plantinga, Alvin. Methodological naturalism. Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 49, no. 3, 1997.
Ruse, Michael. “Methodological Naturalism under Attack.” I.D. Creationism and It's Critics. Ed. Robert T. Pennock. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Ruse, Michael. But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1996.
Stek, John, “What Says the Scriptures?” in Portraits of Creation: Biblical and Scientific Perspectives on the Worlds Formation. Ed. H.J Van Till, R.E Snow, J.H Stek, and D.A Young. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1999.
Van Till, Howard. “Theistic Evolution.” Three Views on Creation and Evolution. Ed. J.P Moreland, John Mark Reynolds. Grands Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999.
Van Till, Howard, David A. Young, Clarence Menninga. Science Held Hostage: What's Wrong with Creation Science and Evolutionism. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988.